DEFENDANT’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
Any “recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged” is discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(A).
Under FED. R. CRIM. PRO. Rule 6(e), the policy of grand jury secrecy does not apply to any witness and therefore there is no impediment to disclosure of the defendant’s own testimony. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.2d 953 (1966).
See also Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S.Ct 1376, 108 L.Ed.2d 572, 110 S.Ct. 1376 (1990) (stating that any proscription of post investigation disclosure by a witness of his own testimony is violative of the First Amendment).
Many courts do not even require a showing of need or relevance in interpreting this rule. See, e.g., United States v. United Concrete Pipe Corp., 41 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Tex. 1966); In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding grand jury witness has right to transcript of his or her own grand jury testimony without any showing of “particularized need”, noting that even if such a showing were required, providing a witness a transcript of his or her own testimony would provide that witness with some protection against future perjury charges).
Recordation of all grand jury proceedings including statements made by prosecution is now required by FED. R. CRIM. PRO. Rule 6(e)(1).
Rule 16(a)(1)(A) also adopts a broad interpretation of the discovery of grand jury testimony of corporate officers or employees where the corporation is a defendant. However, it is interesting to note that this is one of the only provisions of the Rule which requires a motion directly to the court, a point not discussed in the Advisory Committee note, although the note does intimate that testimony of such corporate officers or other officials is now “discoverable as statements of the defendant.” FED. R. CRIM. PRO. Rule 16 Advisory Committee Note 1974.